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ABSTRACT 
Securing Wireless Networks from ARP Cache Poisoning 
by Roney Philip 
 
Wireless networks have become an integral part of today’s networks. The ease 
of deployment, low cost, mobility and high data rates have contributed 
significantly to their popularity. The medium of data transmission in wireless 
networks makes them inherently less secure than wired networks. For wireless 
networks to access the Internet they must be connected to a wired network via 
an Access Point or a wireless router. This has led wireless network equipment 
manufacturers to implement wireless Access Points and wireless routers with a 
built in switch for wired clients and a WiFi access point for wireless clients. The 
set up within the equipment is such that the wired and wireless networks are 
internally bridged together such that they are in a single Local Area Network 
(LAN). This mix of wired and wireless networks poses a new class of attacks on 
wired networks via insecure wireless LANs. One such class of attack is the 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Cache Poisoning attack. Depending on the 
wireless LAN set-up, previously secure wired networks may become vulnerable 
to attacks from wireless clients in the same LAN as the wired client. 
 
My project aims to develop a solution to prevent ARP Cache Poisoning attacks in 
a wireless Access Point-based network, involving wireless and wired clients. I 
have proposed a design to prevent ARP cache poisoning attacks and, as a proof-
of-concept, have implemented the design in a Wireless router manufactured by 
Linksys. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless networks have gained considerable momentum in businesses, 
government offices, hot spots and even buildings requiring high security. 
Wireless networks use radio waves to transmit data. Hence any device located 
within the range of the network and having a wireless network interface card can 
potentially read the data. In a wired network a machine needs to be physically 
connected to the network; such connection points are typically protected by 
physical security measures such as those associated with the perimeters of a 
building. However, with a wireless network, in many cases it is not possible to 
restrict the range of the radio waves to the exact perimeters of physical security. 
This makes wireless networks more vulnerable to attacks than wired networks. 
Various security schemes like Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi 
Protected Access (WPA) have been employed to encrypt the data transmitted 
within a wireless network. Even with these schemes in place, a class of attacks 
known as Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Cache Poisoning is still achievable 
as this class of attack and the above-mentioned encryption schemes are in two 
different layers of the Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
network architecture model.                                                                        
Wireless networks communicate to each other and the Internet via an 
Access Point (AP) or a wireless router. The AP needs to be connected to a 
backbone wired network in order to connect its wireless clients to the Internet. In 
order to achieve this setup the AP is connected to a switch, which serves wired 
clients as shown in Figure 9. This enables the wireless clients to access the 
Internet just like the wired clients connected to this switch. Many network 
equipment manufacturers also provide this setup within a single device by 
providing a built-in switch for wired clients, a built-in AP for wireless clients and a 
built-in router which is to be connected to a modem that connects to the Internet 
as shown in Figure 14. The AP is internally connected to the switch via a bridge. 
A bridge is a device that connects different network interfaces at the data link 
layer (Layer 2) of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network architecture 
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model. The OSI model and its various layers are explained in Section 2. Here, 
the bridge forwards traffic from the wireless network to the wired network after 
converting the 802.11 wireless packets into 802.3 Ethernet packets and vice 
versa. Due to the presence of the bridge between the AP and the switch, all the 
clients connected to the switch and the AP are in a single Local Area Network 
(LAN). Hence, any broadcast packet sent from a wireless client will reach not 
only the wireless clients connected to the AP but also all the wired clients 
connected to the switch. This setup introduces a possible vulnerability in the 
wired network by exposing it to ARP Cache Poisoning attacks from the wireless 
clients. 
ARP Cache Poisoning is a Layer 2 attack. In order for this attack to take 
place the attacker should have access to the LAN. The attacker should be 
connected directly or indirectly to any layer 2 device such as a switch, hub or 
bridge. 
The aim of this project was to find a way to prevent ARP Cache Poisoning 
from wireless networks. According to Fleck, B. et al [1], the approaches to 
prevent ARP Cache Poisoning from wireless networks are the following: 
a. Redesigning the network architecture 
b. Redesigning or upgrading Access Point hardware and firmware 
c. Deploying VPN solutions 
In this project I have taken the approach (b), of upgrading the Access Point 
firmware to prevent ARP cache poisoning from wireless networks. 
The report is organized as follows: 
• Section 2 gives the necessary background on the OSI and TCP/IP network 
architecture models, the ARP protocol and how an ARP cache poisoning 
attack is conducted. It also provides background on wireless networks and 
illustrates how ARP cache poisoning is achieved in wireless networks. This 
section also describes prior research done in solving ARP cache poisoning 
and some of their disadvantages.  
• Section 3 defines the goals for our design, a description of the design itself 
and the components involved in the design.  
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• Section 4 explains the implementation details of our design.  
• Section 5 presents the test cases emulated in a real life network with a 
Linksys WRT54GL wireless router and the results obtained with and without 
the design.  
• Section 6 outlines the contributions, presents some limitations and suggests 
future work for this project. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) 
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, the standard model of 
network architecture, contains seven layers, as shown in Figure 1 [15]. Today, 
most real world networks use the TCP/IP model of network architecture. Figure 1 
places the OSI model and the TCP/IP model side-by-side to show how the 
different layers of the TCP/IP model fall within the layering conventions of the 
OSI model. The figure also places the different protocols in the TCP/IP model 
based on the layer in which they operate.  
The layers are numbered 1-7 from the bottom up. For example, the physical 
layer is layer 1 and the Application layer is layer 7. In the Network layer or layer 3 
of TCP/IP suite, a host is identified by its IP address, a 32-bit number. But the 
Medium Access Control (MAC) layer or layer 2 of the TCP/IP suite follows a 
different addressing scheme. An interface in the MAC layer is identified by a 48-
bit MAC address.  
When layer 3 receives a packet from the higher layers it checks the IP 
address of the destination machine. If the destination machine is in the same 
local network as that of the sending machine, the packet can be sent directly to 
the destination machine; else the IP packet has to be routed via a router. To 
send the packet directly to the destination machine, the network layer needs to  
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Figure 1: The architecture of the TCP/IP reference model [15]  
 
know the MAC address of the destination machine. The network layer of the 
TCP/IP suite accomplishes this using the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). 
ARP dynamically maps the 32-bit IP address of a machine to its 48-bit MAC 
address. 
 
For example, suppose we type the command [13] 
          ftp 10.40.68.22  
The following actions take place: 
1. The FTP client asks the TCP layer to establish a connection with the IP 
address specified in the command. 
2. TCP sends a connection request segment to the destination IP address in 
an IP datagram. 
3. If the destination IP address is on a local network the IP address is 
converted into a 48-bit Ethernet address via ARP. 
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4. ARP broadcasts an ARP request in an Ethernet frame to all the hosts in its 
local network saying ‘who has 10.40.68.22? tell 10.40.68.50’(Assuming 
10.40.68.50 is the IP address of the requesting machine). 
5. Every host that receives the ARP request checks if the target IP address 
belongs to it.  
6. The host having IP address 10.40.68.22 will issue an ARP reply with its 
MAC address in that packet, saying, ‘10.40.68.22 is at 00:0f:d2:ce:43:12’. 
7. Once the ARP reply is received by the sending machine, the IP datagram 
is sent to the destination machine. 
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  ftp 10.40.68.22 
  
 
       
 
(1) establish connection with IP 
address 
 
 
 
 
(2) send IP datagram to destination IP   
address 
                                                          (3) 
 
 
 
                                   (4)       (7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
    (5)    (6)              (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Operation of ARP when the command ftp 10.40.68.22 is typed 
2.1.1 ARP Messages  
 There are four types of messages in the ARP protocol: 
• ARP Request 
 
FTP 
 
TCP 
IP 
 
Ethernet driver 
ARP 
 
Ethernet driver 
 
Ethernet driver 
ARP IP ARP 
 
TCP 
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• ARP Reply 
• RARP Request 
• RARP Reply 
 
Figure 3: Format of an ARP message 
 
The following are the fields of an ARP message:- 
Hardware Type – Specifies what the underlying hardware is. Example, 
Ethernet 
Protocol type- Specifies the type of protocol above this layer 
HLEN – Specifies the length of the hardware address  
PLEN – Specifies the length of the Protocol (Example IP) address 
Operation – Specifies what type of ARP message it is. 
1 - ARP Request 
2 - ARP Reply 
3 – RARP Request4 – RARP Reply 
Sender HA- Hardware Address/MAC address of the sending machine 
Sender IP – IP address of the sending machine 
Target IP – Target IP address of the destination machine 
Target HA - Hardware Address/MAC address of the destination machine 
 
• ARP Request – When a host sends an ARP request it fills in its MAC 
address, IP address, type of ARP message and the target IP address. The 
ARP request is broadcast to all the hosts in the same LAN as the sending 
host. The target HA is left blank for the host with the target IP address to 
fill in. 
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• ARP Reply – When a host receives an ARP request containing its own IP 
address as the target IP address, it fills in the target HA field with its MAC 
address. The host creates an ARP reply with the values of the sender and 
target fields in the ARP request reversed and the Operation field set to the 
opcode of the ARP reply. This packet is then sent only to the requesting 
machine. 
• RARP Request – Reverse Address Resolution Protocol (RARP) is the 
reverse of ARP. A RARP request is sent when a machine wants to get the 
IP address that corresponds to its MAC address. RARP requests are 
broadcast in the LAN. 
• RARP Reply – RARP Reply is sent by RARP servers. If the MAC address 
in the RARP request belongs to one of the clients served by the RARP 
server, a reply is sent with its corresponding IP address.   
In this project we are not considering the RARP request and RARP reply 
as these messages are sent to get the IP address of the requesting machine. 
The ARP cache is not affected when RARP messages are sent or received. 
Hence the ARP Cache Poisoning is not possible with RARP messages. Also, 
most networks use the Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) or a static 
configuration for IP address assignment; hence the usage of RARP is not 
common. 
ARP messages are encapsulated within an Ethernet header, as shown in 
the following figure before they are sent over the network. 
 
Figure 4: ARP message in an Ethernet header 
2.1.2 ARP cache 
 In order to reduce network traffic, the ARP layer in each host maintains a 
cache of the mapping of IP address to MAC address for previously resolved IP 
addresses [13]. This cache is maintained for a short period of time and the entry 
  Roney Philip 
CS298 Report  SJSU 
 
9
is removed when its timeout expires; the timeout is renewed if it is accessed 
again. An entry in the ARP cache is created or updated in the following cases:- 
• Just before a host sends an ARP reply to the machine which sent the 
ARP request, it will create an entry in its ARP cache for the mapping of 
the sender’s IP address to the sender’s MAC address. 
• Whenever a host receives an ARP request from another host, if an 
entry corresponding to the IP address of the sending host exists in its 
ARP cache, the entry will be updated.  
2.2 ARP Cache Poisoning 
ARP Cache Poisoning is the technique by which an attacker maliciously 
modifies the mapping of an IP address to its corresponding MAC address in the 
ARP cache of another host. This is a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack by which 
the attacker can divert the traffic passing between two machines to pass via him. 
 
 
Figure 5: Host C performing the ARP poisoning attack on Host A and Host B 
 
 In Figure 5 the attacker is Host C. It executes the ARP Cache Poisoning 
attack by sending a spoofed ARP reply to Host A saying that ‘IP address of Host 
B maps to MAC address of Host C’ and a spoofed ARP reply to Host B saying 
that ‘IP address of Host A maps to the MAC address of Host C’. ARP is a 
stateless protocol and replies are not checked against pending requests. Hence 
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Host A and Host B will update their ARP cache with the mapping received in the 
ARP replies.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Man-in-the-middle attack 
 
Once the ARP caches of Host A and Host B are poisoned, Host A will send 
all the traffic destined for Host B, to Host C. Similarly Host B will send all traffic 
destined for Host A, to Host C. Host C can now read all the traffic between Host 
A and Host B. If Host C forwards the packets, after reading them, to the actual 
destination machine, then Host A and Host B will not even detect that they are 
being attacked. 
2.2.1 ARP Cache Poisoning Methods 
2.2.1.1 Unsolicited response 
• A spoofed ARP reply could be sent to any host and the receiving 
host will update its ARP cache [10] 
• A spoofed ARP reply could also be broadcast to all hosts in the 
LAN, thus poisoning the ARP cache of all the hosts with just one 
message  
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2.2.1.2 Request  
When a host receives an ARP request, the ARP layer in the host will 
update its ARP cache with the mapping stated in the source IP and source MAC 
address fields of the ARP request packet [10], even if the request was not for that 
host. Hence an attacker only needs to send a spoofed ARP request (inherently 
broadcasted) to poison the cache of all the hosts in a LAN. 
2.2.1.3 Response to a request 
A malicious host in a LAN, on receiving a legitimate ARP request, can 
send a spoofed ARP reply [10]. There could be a race condition between the 
spoofed ARP reply and the legitimate ARP reply in reaching the requesting host. 
The ARP cache will be updated with the last received ARP reply. 
 
2.3 Wireless networks 
Wireless networks or Wireless LANs (WLANs) are LANs in which hosts 
communicate via radio waves.  
2.3.1 Modes of Wireless LANs 
There are two modes of WLANs:- 
• Infrastructure mode – In this type of WLAN, all the wireless clients 
communicate via a base station or an access point (AP). The access point 
acts as a connection to the wired network, which is the backbone for the 
WLAN [14].  
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Figure 7: Infrastructure mode 
 
• Adhoc mode - In this mode, the wireless clients can talk to each other on a 
peer-to-peer basis, without any central server [14].  
 
 
Figure 8: Adhoc mode 
 
 For this project we will only be considering the infrastructure mode of 
WLANs.  The ARP Cache Poisoning problem is more of a threat when a wireless 
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client is trying to attack the wired clients through a wireless AP or a wireless 
router to which they are all connected. In adhoc mode, there is no wireless 
equipment to which the wireless clients and wired clients are commonly 
connected. Hence, the infrastructure mode of WLANs is where the problem 
exists. 
 
2.3.2 Wireless Access Point  
In the infrastructure mode, the wireless clients can communicate only 
through an access point. The access point decodes the radio waves received 
from the wireless clients and sends it to the Internet using an Ethernet 
connection. Similarly the data received from the wired network is encoded into 
radio waves and sent to the wireless clients. 
A wireless client wanting to join a wireless network seeks for available 
Access Points [14]. Every Access Point continuously sends beacons to inform 
wireless stations of its existence. The Access Point sends a Service Set 
Identification (SSID) in the beacon, which distinguishes one access point from 
another. Once the wireless client has identified the access point it wants to join, it 
sends an association request to the Access Point. The wireless client and the AP 
go through a handshake process, which includes exchanging information 
regarding the network and authentication. The AP will authenticate the wireless 
client and intermediates network communication with the wireless client from that 
point onward. 
 Once the client is done using the wireless network, it has to disassociate 
from the AP. If the client does not disassociate and does not use the network for 
a specific period of time, then the association of that client will time out. 
Functions of the Access Point:- 
• Intermediates communication between two wireless stations that are 
communicating with each other 
• Acts as a bridge between the 802.11 network and the wired network 
such as the 802.3 network. 
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2.4 ARP Cache Poisoning in Wireless Networks 
ARP cache poisoning is an attack prevalent in LANs, i.e., all hosts 
connected to the same switch or hub as that of a malicious host are vulnerable to 
this attack. Access points act as hubs for wireless networks and act as bridges 
between wireless networks and wired networks. The general setup of a wireless 
network bridged to a wired LAN is as shown in Figure 9. 
As in the setup in Figure 9, the wired clients are connected to the same 
switch as that of the Access point. Any message broadcast from wireless hosts A 
and C reaches the wired Host B. The broadcast domain of a network includes all 
the machines connected to a switch [1]. Here the AP is connected to the switch, 
hence all the wireless hosts associated with that AP belong to the broadcast 
domain of that switch. The wired clients connected directly to the  
 
 
Figure 9: General set-up of wireless network with the wired network 
 
switch also fall in the broadcast domain of that switch. ARP requests are 
broadcast in a LAN. Hence all the hosts in the broadcast domain receive the 
ARP requests. This in turn makes the wired hosts connected to the same switch 
as that of an AP vulnerable to an attack from wireless clients. 
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Generally, in hot spots like cafes, car dealerships etc., an Access Point will 
be provided to customers who have a wireless host so as to get connected to the 
wireless network. The general setup is such that the AP will be connected to a 
switch to which the café’s wired hosts are also connected. The wired hosts could 
be transmitting confidential information among each other. This information can 
be easily read if a malicious wireless customer does a MiM attack using ARP 
Cache Poisoning. 
The ARP cache poisoning attack can be performed even if the wireless 
clients are in a wireless network enabled with security features like Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). WEP and WPA 
encrypt the Layer 2 packets. ARP, being in the same layer as IP, is a Layer 3 
protocol. Hence the poisoned ARP packets sent in a wireless network are sent 
within a WEP or WPA encrypted frame. The wireless clients that are doing the 
ARP cache poisoning attack have already joined the network and hence all 
packets sent from these wireless clients are encrypted. The Access Point will 
accept and forward these packets to the destination wireless machine because 
they are WEP or WPA encrypted with the initially assigned key. When the packet 
reaches the destination machine the frame is decrypted and the spoofed 
mapping is read from the ARP frame. The ARP cache is updated with the 
spoofed mapping, thus poisoning the ARP cache. 
2.4.1 Attack Scenarios 
2.4.1.1 Attacking wired clients using a wireless client 
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Figure 10: Wireless client attacking wired clients 
 
 In this scenario, a wireless client, the Attacker, sends a spoofed ARP 
packet to Host A stating that Host B’s IP address is mapped to the Attacker’s 
MAC address. Similarly the Attacker sends a spoofed ARP packet to Host B 
stating that Host A’s IP address has the Attacker’s MAC address. Thus the 
Attacker poisons the ARP caches of Hosts A and B, thereby directing the traffic 
between them to go through the Attacker [1]. 
2.4.1.2 Attacking a wireless client and a wired client 
 
Figure 11: Wireless client attacking a wired client and a wireless client 
  
 In Figure 11, the Attacker sends spoofed ARP packets to wired Host B 
and Wireless Host A, thereby poisoning their ARP caches.  Both the victims are 
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in the same broadcast domain as that of the Attacker, hence spoofed ARP 
packets will reach the victims [1]. 
2.4.1.3 Attacking wireless hosts 
 
Figure 12: Attacking wireless clients 
 An Attacker can also attack two wireless hosts, which are in association 
with the same AP as the Attacker, as they are in the same broadcast domain [1].  
2.4.1.4 Attacking roaming wireless hosts 
 
 
Figure 13: Attacking roaming wireless hosts 
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 In Figure 13, there are multiple APs connected to the same switch. In 
802.11b networks, to achieve roaming, the APs need to be connected to the 
same switch [1]. Due to this set up all the wireless hosts associated with these 
APs belong in the same broadcast domain. Hence any forged ARP packet sent 
from the Attacker can reach any wireless host connected to any of these APs. 
2.4.1.5 Attacking home networks 
Most vendors sell a combined router, switch and access point in one device 
as shown in Figure 14 [1]. In these devices the switch is for wired clients in the 
same LAN, the router is for the users to connect to their Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) and the AP is for wireless hosts in the LAN. Such a device satisfies the 
needs of a home network. 
 
Figure 14: Combined home gateway device 
  
 In this combination device the AP is connected to the same switch as the 
wired clients. This results in the wired clients being vulnerable to an ARP Cache 
Poisoning attack from wireless clients. With this combined home gateway device, 
the above-mentioned attack scenarios from 2.4.1.1 – 2.4.1.2 are possible on 
home networks as well, as shown in Figure 15 and Figure 16 [1].  
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Figure 15: Attacking two wired clients via a wireless client in a home deployment 
 
 
Figure 16: Attacking a wired client and a wireless client in a home network 
 
2.5 Prior Research 
 There are several existing solutions to ARP Cache Poisioning; however, a 
detailed study shows that there are some disadvantages in the existing solutions. 
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 Issac, B. et al [2] proposes ‘Secure Unicast ARP by extending DHCP’ to 
prevent ARP cache poisoning. In this solution, when Host A wants to 
communicate with Host B, it first sends a secure unicast ARP request packet to a 
DHCP+ server. A Secure Unicast ARP (S-UARP) request packet is a unicast 
ARP request packet sent to a DHCP+ server. The DHCP+ server is an enhanced 
DHCP server that understands Secure Unicast ARP packet formats. The DHCP+ 
server has information about the IP and MAC address mapping of all the hosts to 
which it has leased an IP address. Hence it responds with the MAC address 
mapped to the requested IP address in an encrypted format.  It is a trusted party 
and the messages are encrypted before transmission, with a secret key that has 
been distributed to the client and the server by a Certification Authority. This 
makes sure that Host A will not get an ARP packet, which could cause poisoning. 
The drawback of this solution is that it requires modification to the ARP protocol, 
which means that all the Hosts in a LAN that want to prevent ARP Cache 
poisoning would have to modify their kernels to reflect the modified ARP protocol. 
It would also require a DHCP+ server, which would understand the secure 
unicast ARP packet and respond to it. Another modification that would be 
required is to the DHCP relay agent, as it has to be able to identify an S-UARP 
packet and forward it to the DHCP+ server.   
 Brushi et al [9] has proposed a Secure ARP (S-ARP), which uses 
asymmetric key cryptography to authenticate the hosts in a LAN. A Certification 
Authority assigns a private/public key pair to every host in the LAN. Each ARP 
packet sent from a host is signed with the host’s private key. The receiving host 
verifies the signature of the ARP packet using the sending host’s public key. To 
include the signature of the sending host in the ARP packet, an additional header 
is inserted at the end of the standard ARP protocol header. The solution in [9] 
also requires modification to the ARP protocol as the sender needs to sign each 
ARP message with his private key and the receiving host needs to verify the 
signature with the sender’s public key. The author mentions in [9] that to get the 
entire LAN completely secure, all the hosts should be S-ARP enabled. S-ARP 
also introduces additional overhead and time for signature and verification by the 
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sender and the receiver respectively, for each ARP message. The other issue 
with this solution is that this is not a feasible approach for a wireless network 
environment like a hotspot, where the wireless clients entering the network are 
random and short-time users who cannot be expected to have S-ARP enabled.  
 Tripunithara, et al proposed a Middleware approach to prevent ARP cache 
poisoning in [10]. This approach maintains a ‘requested’ queue and a 
‘responded’ queue in each host. If the host has sent an ARP request, it will be 
entered in the ‘requested’ queue and when the corresponding reply is received, it 
is entered in the ‘responded’ queue. Hence, whenever an ARP response is 
received, it is allowed to update the ARP cache only if there is a corresponding 
request in its request queue. The solution prevents the ARP Cache Poisoning 
attacks, but each and every host in the LAN has to be modified. The scale of 
deployment is very high.  
3. DESIGN 
3.1 Design goals 
3.1.1 Protocol should remain unmodified 
One of the major design goals for my project was that the ARP protocol 
itself should not require any modification.  ARP protocol, as part of the TCP/IP 
suite, is a very popularly used protocol for mapping a host’s IP address to its 
MAC address. The TCP/IP suite is widely deployed. Hence any protocol changes 
would require modification in all the hosts that need to use the protocol. In our 
design only the access point needs to be modified, hence the scale of 
deployment is much less compared to having to deploy the modification in all the 
hosts in a LAN.  
3.1.2 Transparent to the users 
The other design goal was to ensure that the security added to this protocol 
would be transparent to the users. For example, the user would not have to 
create any password or key to enable security from these attacks. By our design 
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the wireless clients just need to send ARP packets to the Access Point in the 
usual manner and it is the responsibility of the Access Point to monitor the 
packets for ARP Cache Poisoning attacks and make sure that the wireless 
clients are secure.  
3.1.3 Minimal overhead when sending and receiving ARP packets 
One of the other design goals was to make sure that there is minimal 
overhead in terms of expensive operations, associated with sending and 
receiving an ARP packet. For example, the sending host should not have to sign 
each ARP packet and the receiving host should not have to verify each ARP 
packet received using the public key of the sending host. These expensive 
operations would result in increasing the round-trip time of an ARP response 
being received, which ultimately affects the round trip time of the upper layer 
protocols.  
3.2 The Design 
3.2.1 Wireless clients and DHCP 
In order for a wireless client to communicate via the wireless card, it has to 
associate with an Access Point. Once the wireless client associates with the 
Access Point, it has to get an IP address in order for it to connect to clients 
outside its LAN or to the Internet. In most networks today, the wireless client gets 
an IP address for itself from a DHCP (Dynamic Host Control Protocol) server. 
This is accomplished by sending a DHCP request; the DHCP protocol is 
explained in the next section.  
3.2.2 DHCP Protocol 
The DHCP protocol is a way of providing host-specific configuration 
parameters as well as providing network/IP addresses to the hosts from a DHCP 
server.  
For the rest of our discussion we are only interested in the function of DHCP 
in providing IP addresses to the hosts. Figure 17 shows the timeline diagram of 
  Roney Philip 
CS298 Report  SJSU 
 
23
messages exchanged when a host tries to get an IP address from a DHCP 
server. There could be multiple DHCP servers in the same LAN as that of the 
client. The client first broadcasts a DHCP DISCOVER message to locate the 
       Server          Client          Server 
             (not selected)                    (selected) 
                  v               v               v 
                  |               |               | 
                  |     Begins initialization     | 
                  |               |               | 
                  | _____________/|\____________  | 
                  |/DHCPDISCOVER  | DHCPDISCOVER \| 
              Determines          |          Determines 
             configuration        |         configuration 
                  |               |               | 
                  |\              |  ____________/| 
                  | \________     | /DHCPOFFER    | 
                  | DHCPOFFER\    |/              | 
                  |           \   |               | 
                  |       Collects replies        | 
                  |             \ |               | 
                  |     Selects configuration     | 
                  | _____________/|\____________  | 
                  |/ DHCPREQUEST  |  DHCPREQUEST\ | 
                  |               |               | 
                  |               |     Commits configuration 
                  |               |               | 
                  |               | _____________/| 
                  |               |/ DHCPACK      | 
                  |               |               | 
                  |    Initialization complete    | 
                  .               .               . 
                  .               .               . 
                  |      Graceful shutdown        | 
                  |               |\ ____________ | 
                  |               | DHCPRELEASE  \| 
                  |               |        Discards lease 
                  |               |               | 
Figure 17: Timeline diagram of DHCP messages exchanged 
 
available DHCP servers. All the DHCP servers that received the message will 
send DHCP OFFER messages with the configuration parameters they can offer 
to the host. The client then selects the configuration provided by one of the 
DHCP servers and sends a DHCP REQUEST message to all the servers 
indicating which DHCP server it has selected and also requesting the 
configuration parameters the selected DHCP server had offered. The selected 
DHCP server will lease that IP address to the requesting client and will send a 
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DHCP ACK message as a confirmation to the client. The IP address given to the 
client will not be given to any other host till the lease period is over. 
 
 
The format of a DHCP message is as shown in Figure 18.  
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |     op (1)    |   htype (1)   |   hlen (1)    |   hops (1)    | 
   +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ 
   |                            xid (4)                            | 
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ 
   |           secs (2)            |           flags (2)           | 
   +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ 
   |                          ciaddr  (4)                          | 
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
   |                          yiaddr  (4)                          | 
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
   |                          siaddr  (4)                          | 
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
   |                          giaddr  (4)                          | 
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
   |                          chaddr  (16)                         | 
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
   |                          sname   (64)                         | 
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
   |                          file    (128)                        | 
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
   |                          options (variable)                   | 
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Figure 18: Format of a DHCP message 
 
The fields required for the rest of our discussion are explained below: 
 
Fields   Description 
opcode   Message op code/ message type 
       1= BOOTREQUEST, 2= BOOTREPLY 
yiaddr ‘your’ (requesting client’s) IP address, the IP address     
assigned by the DHCP server to the client 
giaddr  Relay agent IP address 
chaddr  client hardware address 
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The format of the DHCP message remains the same for all the message 
types discussed above. But with each iteration the fields in the DHCP message 
get filled progressively. The ‘opcode’ indicates the type of DHCP message. 
During the DHCP DISCOVER – DHCP REQUEST message iterations the 
‘yiaddr’ field is not filled. In the DHCP ACK message the IP address assigned to 
the client is put in this field. In the DHCP ACK message all the fields of the DHCP 
message are filled. The ‘giaddr’ is the default gateway address, to which the 
client sends packets destined for machines outside its LAN. The ‘chaddr’ field 
contains the MAC address of the requesting client machine.  
• As the DHCP server and the DHCP messages contain the original IP 
address and MAC address of all the DHCP-enabled machines in a 
LAN, the Access Point can get the IP-to-MAC address mapping 
directly from the DHCP server or build up the mapping by monitoring 
DHCP messages. It can use this information to verify future ARP 
packets that are passing through it. This leads to the following 
alternatives:Design using the DHCP leases file 
• Design using the DHCP ACK message 
3.2.3 Design using the DHCP leases file 
In most Access Points the DHCP Server exists within the Access Point 
itself. In that case the DHCP server will store all the IP addresses that it has 
leased out within that network along with their MAC addresses, retrieved from the 
DHCP messages, in the dhcp.leases file. This file will include all the wired clients 
connected to the switch within the Access Point and all the wireless clients 
associated with the Access Point. Whenever the Access Point sees an ARP 
request or reply, it can check the dhcp.leases file to verify whether the mapping 
in the ARP request/reply corresponds to the one in the file. If the mapping is not 
valid, the ARP request/reply packet can be choked. This prevents the ARP 
request/reply from poisoning the ARP cache of all the hosts connected to the 
Access Point as well as preventing the spoofed ARP packet from reaching the 
wired network.  
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3.2.4 Design using the DHCP ACK message 
In a wireless network, since all the wireless clients can only communicate 
through the Access Point, every packet generated by or destined for a wireless 
client first reaches the Access Point. Hence, when a wireless client requests an 
IP address from the DHCP server, the DHCP messages are first received by the 
Access Point. The Access Point creates a mapping table, which stores the 
mapping of IP addresses to MAC addresses. The DHCP ACK message contains 
the client’s MAC address and IP address. Every packet that reaches the Access 
Point should be scanned for a DHCP ACK message. Whenever a DHCP ACK 
message is encountered the IP address to MAC address mapping should be 
retrieved and stored in a mapping table created by the Access Point to store IP 
address to MAC address mappings. Since all the wireless clients registered with 
the Access Point have to get an IP address using the DHCP protocol, the 
mapping table will contain the correct mapping of all the wireless clients that 
communicate through this Access Point. Now, whenever the Access Point sees 
an ARP request or reply, it can use its mapping table to verify whether the 
mapping in the ARP request/reply is valid. If the mapping is not valid, the ARP 
request/reply packet can be choked. This prevents the ARP request/reply from 
poisoning the ARP cache of all the hosts connected to the Access Point as well 
as preventing the spoofed ARP packet from reaching the wired network.  
3.2.5 Components of the system 
3.2.5.1 Mapping table 
The Access Point creates a hash table with IP address as the key and a 
structure containing the MAC address and the time of expiry (the time of expiry is 
calculated by retrieving the lease time and calculating the Access Point’s time at 
the end of the lease time) as the value. Keeping the IP address as the key 
ensures that there are no duplicate IP addresses and each IP address maps to 
only one MAC address. Whenever an attacker spoofs an ARP message, he will 
be mapping a victim’s IP address to his MAC address. Since an entry already 
exists in the mapping table containing the victim’s IP address mapped to the 
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victim’s MAC address, this message will be detected as an ARP poisoning 
packet.  
 This mapping table can be derived from the dhcp.leases file in an Access 
Point with a DHCP server running within it. 
3.2.5.2 DHCP Agent 
The DHCP agent scans all the incoming traffic, searching for a DHCP ACK 
message. Whenever the DHCP ACK message is encountered, the DHCP Agent 
will retrieve the values of the fields ‘yiaddr’ and ‘chaddr’ and store them as a new 
entry or overwrite the IP address and MAC address columns of an existing entry 
in the mapping table. There are two ways by which the mapping table is updated: 
Case 1: New entry in the mapping table 
A new entry is created in the mapping table when the DHCP server is 
assigning an IP address to the requesting client for the first time.  
Case 2: Overwrite an existing entry 
This happens when the DHCP server is extending the lease of an IP 
address previously assigned to the requesting client.  
 If the DHCP server exists within the Access Point, the DHCP server does 
the dhcp agent’s work and the mappings are stored in the dhcp.leases file. 
3.2.5.3 ARP Patrol Agent 
The ARP Patrol Agent monitors all incoming traffic, looking for ARP 
messages. Irrespective of whether the ARP message is a request or reply, the 
mapping of the source IP to source MAC address is verified with the entries in 
the mapping table or the dhcp.leases file. We only check the source IP and the 
source MAC address mapping because, whether it’s an ARP reply or request, 
the attacker is trying to spoof the source addresses since the receiving machine 
updates its ARP cache using the values in the source address fields. If the 
mapping is not valid, the ARP packet is choked. 
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3.3 Algorithm 
3.3.1 DHCP agent algorithm 
The algorithm for the DHCP agent is as follows: 
 
Whenever a DHCP frame is received: 
 If the field, ‘Message type’ in the DHCP packet is Boot reply 
  If the ‘DHCP Message Type’ is DHCP ACK 
Retrieve the IP address from the field ‘yiaddr’ and search 
for it in the mapping table  
If the yiaddr does not exist,  
Add it as a new entry into the mapping table.  
Retrieve the MAC address from the field ‘chaddr’ 
and add it as a value corresponding to the previously 
entered key. 
   Else, 
Retrieve the MAC address from the field ‘chaddr’ 
and update the value corresponding to the retrieved 
key 
  Else, 
   Do nothing 
 Else, 
  Do nothing 
 
3.3.2 ARP Patrol agent algorithm 
The algorithm for the ARP Patrol agent is as follows 
 
When an ARP frame is received: 
 If source IP address in the packet is an entry in the DHCP hash table or 
dhcp.leases file and the expiry time has not passed 
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If the MAC address corresponding to the IP address in the 
hash table or dhcp.leases file is the same as the source MAC 
address in the packet 
Accept the packet 
Else,  
 Drop the packet (Do not let the packet be sent to the 
destination machine) 
 Else,  
If the expiry time has passed 
Remove the entry in the mapping table and drop the ARP 
packet 
  Else, 
this ARP packet is accepted. 
 
This algorithm protects all machines within a network, which have received 
their IP addresses via the DHCP protocol, from ARP cache poisoning. An 
attacker trying to perform an ARP cache poisoning attack will be spoofing the 
source IP address in the ARP packet with the victim’s IP address and the source 
MAC address with the attacker’s own MAC address. If the victim has received 
the IP address via the DHCP protocol, the IP address to MAC address mapping 
of the victim machine would be in the DHCP mapping table or the dhcp.leases 
file. When the ARP patrol agent receives the spoofed ARP packet from the 
attacker, the attack is immediately detected and packet is dropped.  
 
4. IMPLEMENTATION 
This section explains how the design described above was implemented in 
a real world wireless Access Point. It first describes the choices available in 
hardware and the one that was chosen for this project. This section also 
describes in detail the ‘open source firmware’ that was chosen to be uploaded 
into the hardware in order to make the modifications. 
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4.1 Hardware 
The choice of hardware was based on which manufacturers were providing 
source code for their firmware. The two open source wireless Access Points that 
I explored were EW-7209APg manufactured by Edimax and WRT54GL 
manufactured by Linksys. 
4.1.1 EW7209APg by Edimax 
The EW7209APg is a wireless Access Point that complies with the IEEE 
802.11b/g 2.4 GHz specification along with a built-in 5-port 10/100 M switch. The 
hardware also provides a DHCP server within it. One of the advantages of this 
hardware is that the firmware is upgradeable via a web server. The problem 
encountered with this hardware was that all the necessary tools and other 
support needed for correctly building the source code were not available. The 
build scripts were not complete and this resulted in the developer-compiled 
firmware not being usable to upgrade the hardware. 
4.1.2 WRT54GL by Linksys 
WRT54GL is a Wi-Fi enabled router manufactured by Linksys, through 
which wireless and wired clients can share an Internet connection using the 
802.3 Ethernet and 802.11b/g data link layers. WRT54GL combines the 
functionality of an Ethernet switch, wireless access point and a router. The 
wireless access point serves wireless clients and the Ethernet switch connects 
the wired clients. The router connects all of the wired and wireless clients via a 
DSL connection or a high-speed cable to the Internet. The wireless router also 
acts as a DHCP server to all the clients connected to the wireless access point 
and the Ethernet switch.  
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Figure 19: WRT54GL wireless router 
 
Specifications and Hardware Inside of WRT54GL:  
CPU speed   : 200 MHz  
RAM    : 16 MB  
Flash memory   :  4 MB 
System-On-Chip         : Broadcom 5352EKPB 
Wireless          : Integrated Broadcom BCM2050KML 
Switch             : Built-in 
 
The WRT54GL has the Linux operating system running in it. Hence under 
the obligations of the GNU General Public License (GPL) Linksys has released 
the firmware source code. One of the advantages of having the Linux OS running 
in the hardware is that developers can open a telnet session to the hardware and 
make modifications by running a shell within the hardware itself. The packages 
compatible for the Linux OS can be downloaded and added to the hardware, 
facilitating development work on the WRT54GL. Various development projects 
have been done on the WRT54GL’s original firmware source code resulting in 
many third party open source firmware code bases. Some of the third party open 
source firmware code bases are: 
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• DDWrt – DDWrt is a third party firmware developed from the existing Linux 
source code in the WRT5GL Linksys router. The firmware adds more 
features to the original router code. This firmware is mainly used for 
increasing the functionality of the router and customizing it. It is not 
intended for open source development although the source code is 
available.  
• OpenWrt – OpenWrt is a third party firmware developed from scratch 
using the stock firmware of the WRT54GL wireless router. It is intended 
for developers to be able to add features and publish them to the OpenWrt 
community of developers. 
4.2 OpenWrt Firmware  
For this project I chose OpenWrt.  
4.2.1 About OpenWrt 
 OpenWrt is a Linux distribution, which has its own writable file system and 
package management system [6]. It contains more than 100 software packages 
and provides facilities in the source code to include more add-on packages. The 
OpenWrt source code is oriented towards developers by providing a build 
system, which enables developers to modify the firmware by changing the source 
code.  
4.2.2 Compiling source code for embedded systems 
Source code for embedded systems cannot be compiled within the 
embedded system itself. Embedded systems have lower processing power and 
memory; hence it is not possible to run a compiler directly on an embedded 
system. Instead, we need to have a cross compiler on our development machine 
that will compile the firmware and produce the binary for our embedded system.  
4.2.3 Building OpenWrt image 
OpenWrt’s build script has been made easy for developers to download the 
source code and build the firmware image [6]. OpenWrt’s Makefiles are written in 
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such a way that they will download the sources, apply necessary patches to work 
with the given platform and compile the source code for the given platform.  The 
developer does not need to download the appropriate cross-compiler or the 
patches for the kernel or any other packages necessary for the source code to be 
compiled since the Makefiles will do it automatically if necessary. 
One of the challenges I faced was to understand the design and 
implementation details of the source code. In addition to the Linux kernel, there 
are also several packages/modules specific to the router and the OpenWrt 
distribution. There’s very little, if any, documentation on the design and code 
details. It was also necessary to understand how the Makefiles are structured in 
OpenWrt, so that upon making changes to parts of the source code tree, those 
parts would actually get built with the changes and not get regenerated from the 
original source.   
 
4.3 Code placement 
One of the coding-level challenges in this project was to find the appropriate 
location to hook the arp_patrol_agent() code. As the DHCP server was already in 
the system, I followed the ‘Design using dhcp.leases file’ approach, thus not 
needing to implement the dhcp_agent () in this hardware. The arp_patrol_agent() 
needed to be placed in such a location where I could monitor packets 
irrespective of whether they are sent  by  a wireless client or a wired client.  
 There exists a framework called Netfilter for doing packet filtering/mangling 
at the kernel level. Different layers in the network stack provide network hooks. 
Hooks are specific locations in the code to which software can register itself. 
Kernel modules that want to mangle packets should register with these netfilter 
hooks. Whenever the code reaches the netfilter hooks, the kernel modules that 
have registered with these hooks will be invoked. 
As shown in Fig 20, in the OpenWrt firmware, the wired Ethernet interface 
(vlan0) and the wireless interface (eth1) are connected by a bridge, represented 
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by the br0 interface.  A packet being transmitted from the Ethernet interface to 
the wireless interface or vice-versa is forwarded by the bridge.  
 
 
Figure 20: Internal diagram of the OpenWrt firmware [6] 
 
The Ethernet bridging code of the OpenWrt firmware has defined six netfilter 
hooks. The main hooks are the INPUT, FORWARD and OUTPUT hooks. The 
INPUT hook is located at the point where the bridge has decided that the packet 
is destined for the local computer. The FORWARD hook is located at the point 
where the bridge has decided that the packets are to be forwarded to the other 
side of the bridge. The OUTPUT hook is located at the point where the bridging 
decision has been made for packets that originated in the router. A kernel 
module called Ebtables is registered with these netfilter hooks. Ebtables [12] 
refers to Ethernet bridging tables and can be used to parse the Layer 2 header of 
the packets passing via the bridge. Every packet that passes via the bridge from 
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one Layer 2 interface to another Layer 2 interface has to pass through the 
netfilter FORWARD hook, which will invoke the ebtables module. This parsing of 
packets by Ebtables is not done by default. As part of my implementation, I force 
the Ebtables module to parse the Layer 2 header of every packet passing via the 
bridge. When an ARP packet is detected, Ebtables invokes the ebt_arp_filter() 
function. In this function I have added my arp_patrol_agent() hook. The 
arp_patrol_agent detects the occurrence of an ARP poisoning attack. Depending 
on the verdict from the arp_patrol_agent() the ebt_arp_filter() function is asked to 
DROP or ACCEPT the packet . 
4.4 Implementation details 
This section describes the implementation details of the various components 
of the system. 
4.4.1 dhcp.leases file 
The DHCP server in the router assigns IP addresses to wireless clients and 
wired clients that are connected to the router. For every IP address assigned the 
server stores the IP address and the MAC address of the machine to which the 
IP address is assigned, in a dhcp.leases file. The fully qualified path of the file in 
this firmware is /tmp/dhcp.leases 
 
Format of the dhcp.leases file: 
946689575   00:00:00:00:00:05   192.168.1.155   wdt       01:00:00:00:00:00:05 
946689522   00:00:00:00:00:04   192.168.1.237     *         01:00:00:00:00:00:04 
946689351   00:0f:b0:3a:b5:0b    192.168.1.208 colinux      * 
946689493   02:0f:b0:3a:b5:0b    192.168.1.199     *         01:02:0f:b0:3a:b5:0b 
 
The first column is the time of lease expiry in epoch time (seconds since 
1970), the second column is the MAC address, the third column is the assigned 
IP address, the fourth column is the host name and the fifth column is the client-
id usually derived from the client’s MAC address. The dhcp.leases file is updated 
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every time an IP address is assigned newly or when a client renews the lease 
time for a previously assigned IP address. The entry is removed when the lease 
expires. Hence the dhcp.leases file is always up to date. 
4.4.2 arp_patrol_agent()   
static  int  arp_patrol_agent(const sk_buff *skb) 
Parameters: sk_buff  *skb 
Returns: 0 if there is a poisoning attack detected and 1 if there is no 
attackdetected 
sk_buff - It is the packet structure used in the Linux Operating system to 
transfer a network packet between the different layers of the network stack.  
 
Figure 21: Structure of sk_buff 
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Once a packet is received at the physical layer, which is the NIC, the device 
driver creates an sk_buff structure and populates it with IP data [11]. The device 
driver then calls the function netif_rx() to pass the sk_buff structure to the upper 
layer protocols.  
 
Description of the important fields follows: 
sk: pointer to the socket owning this packet 
stamp: time this packet arrived 
h: transport layer header pointer 
nh: network layer header 
mac: pointer to link layer header 
len: actual data length 
next: pointer to the next sk_buff{} 
prev: pointer to the previous sk_buff{} 
dev: dev currently being used 
data: pointer to the start of data. 
tail: pointer to end of protocol data. 
end: pointer to end of the buffer holding  
 
The sk_buff structure has a pointer nh, to the network layer header; in the 
case of an ARP packet the network layer header is the ARP header. From the 
ARP header, the function will read the source IP address and check if that IP 
address exists in the dhcp.leases file. If so, the function will retrieve the source 
MAC address from the sk_buff structure and compare it with the one in the 
dhcp.leases file, corresponding to the source IP address. If the mapping in the 
packet is not the same as the mapping in the dhcp.leases file a value of 0 is 
returned, else a value of 1 is returned. If the IP address in the sk_buff structure 
does not exist in the dhcp.leases file, a value of 1 is returned. 
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4.4.3 Boot script changes 
The kernel module, Ebtables, into which I hooked my arp_patrol_agent, 
does not get loaded into the kernel by default at boot time. The user can start an 
ssh or a telnet session with the router and type insmod (insert module) on the 
command line to get Ebtables and other related modules to be loaded. In order to 
automate the process of ARP cache poisoning detection, I’ve modified an 
OpenWrt boot script to insert the necessary modules at boot time.  
When the OpenWrt distribution of the Linux Operating system boots up, it 
runs all the boot scripts starting with the letter ‘S’ in the /etc/init.d directory. The 
daemons and background processes that need to be run when the system is 
booting up are included in these scripts. One such boot script is the ‘S10boot’ 
script. I have added the commands to insert the modules ebtables, ebt_arp and 
ebtable_filter in this boot script.   
4.4.4 Limitation of this implementation 
The WRT54GL router uses a Broadcom chipset in its wireless Access Point. 
Broadcom does not release the device driver source code that handles the 
transmission of packets from one wireless client to another wireless client. The 
arp_patrol_agent() needs only to be hooked into the device driver code for the 
ARP cache poisoning attack to be prevented from one wireless client to another 
wireless client. But since the source code is not available, the agent has currently 
not been hooked into the driver. 
 
5. TEST CASES AND RESULTS 
This section describes the various tests done to poison a host’s ARP cache, 
emulating various attack scenarios as described in Section 2.4.1. The tests were 
conducted on a combined home gateway, the Linksys WRT54GL wireless router. 
The results show what the ARP cache contains before and after the 
arp_patrol_agent() was added.  In addition to the Linksys WRT54GL wireless 
router, the test environment contained a Pentium III desktop with 512 MB RAM 
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running Windows 2000, connected to the to the 10/100 M switch of the wireless 
router using an Ethernet cable. A Dell Latitude D620 laptop having 1.83 GHz 
CPU speed with 1.99 Gb RAM running Fedora Linux and a Dell Inspiron 1000 
laptop with 2.19 GHz, 44MB RAM, running Windows XP Home Edition, 
bothequipped with a Wireless NIC card and an Ethernet NIC card, were 
interchangeably connected to the wireless router as wired or wireless clients as 
required by the attack scenario.  
5.1 Attack scenarios tested 
5.1.1 Attacking wired clients using a wireless client 
The setup of the LAN for this attack scenario is as shown in Fig 24. Host A 
and Host B are wired clients connected to the 10/100 M switch of the wireless 
router and the Attacker is a wireless client connected to the Access Point in the 
wireless router.  
 
Figure 22: Attacking wired clients from wireless client 
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Host A and Host B want to communicate with each other. The Attacker 
wants to divert the communication between Host A and Host B to flow through 
the Attacker. The IP address and MAC address of each machine areas indicated 
in the Figure 22.   
Before the attack:- 
Host A’s arp cache after communicating with Host B is as follows: 
 
Figure 23: ARP cache of Host A before the attack 
Host B’s arp cache after communicating with Host A is as follows: 
 
Figure 24: ARP cache of Host B before the attack 
 
Demonstration of the attack: 
To perform an ARP cache poisoning attack the Attacker sends a spoofed 
ARP reply to Host A with Host B’s IP address as the source IP address and the 
Attacker’s MAC address as the source MAC address. Similarly the Attacker 
sends a spoofed ARP reply packet to Host B with Host A’s IP address as the 
source IP address and the Attacker’s MAC address as the source MAC address. 
After the attack:-  
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Host A’s arp cache: 
 Figure 25: ARP cache of Host A after the attack 
 
Host B’s arp cache: 
 
Figure 26: ARP cache of Host B after the attack 
 
ARP Cache Poisoning prevention with arp_patrol_agent() : - 
 With my design when the Attacker sends a spoofed ARP packet to Hosts 
A and B, the packet travels through the Ethernet Bridge to reach the wired 
clients. In the bridge the arp_patrol_agent() checks if the source IP address and 
the source MAC address mapping in the ARP packet is the same as the mapping 
in the dhcp.leases file. Since the mappings are not same the ARP packet is 
dropped and hence the packets do not reach Hosts A and B. 
After performing the attack: -  
Host A’s ARP cache: 
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Figure 27: ARP cache of Host A when arp_patrol_agent() is enabled 
 
Host B’s arp cache: 
 
Figure 28: ARP cache of Host B when arp_patrol_agent() is enabled 
5.1.2 Attacking a wireless client and a wired client 
In this scenario, the setup of the LAN is as shown in Fig 29. Host B is a 
wired client connected to the 10/100 M switch of the wireless router and the 
Attacker is a wireless client connected to the Access Point in the wireless router.  
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Figure 29: Attacking a wireless and a wired client 
 
Before the attack:- 
Host B’s ARP cache after communicating with Host A is as follows: 
 Figure 30: ARP cache of Host B before the attack 
Demonstration of the attack: 
The Attacker is a wireless client over here and sends a spoofed ARP packet 
to Hosts A and B as before. 
After the attack:-  
Host B’s arp cache:  
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 Figure 31: ARP cache of Host B after the attack 
 
ARP Cache Poisoning prevention with the arp_patrol_agent():- 
 The Attacker’s spoofed ARP packet travels over the Ethernet bridge to 
reach the wired Host B. The ARP packet is dropped by the arp_patrol_agent() on 
detecting a wrong mapping of IP address and MAC address. Thus the Attacker is 
not successful in doing a Man-in-the-middle attack as he cannot poison the ARP 
cache of the wired Host B, disabling him from diverting the traffic between the 
Host A and Host B. 
After the attack:-  
Host B’s arp cache: 
 
Figure 32: ARP cache of Host B when arp_patrol_agent is enabled 
 
5.2 Impact on Performance 
I have studied the impact on performance that the arp_patrol_agent will 
introduce to the ARP protocol. I tested the round trip time (RTT), from when an 
ARP request is sent to when a corresponding ARP reply is received. The RTT 
was measured when the router is running the arp_patrol_agent as well as when 
the router is not running the arp_patrol_agent.  
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The performance test was done by sending 1000 pings (ICMP echo 
requests) from a host A to a host B.  The ping causes the host A to issue an ARP 
request to B and receive an ARP reply from B. After each ping command the 
ARP cache of A was cleared. From an Ethereal trace running in A, we were able 
to measure the RTT of an ARP request-reply pair.  
Round trip time measurements for ARP
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Figure 33: Round trip time measurement for ARP request-reply in ms 
 
I have plotted a graph of 10 points where each point represents the average 
of the RTT of 100 ARP request-reply pairs. The averaging was done because, as 
can be expected, there is a lot of variance in the RTT. As we see from the graph 
in Figure 33, the increase in RTT of ARP when the arp_patrol_agent is running is 
almost negligible. I have also plotted another graph, Figure 34, which shows the 
percentage increase or decrease in the RTT of ARP when the arp_patrol_agent 
is running. From the above tests I have observed that the average performance 
degradation when the arp_patrol_agent is running is approximately 1.65%. Also, 
as exemplified by the sixth point, the variance in RTT due to extraneous factors, 
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like load on the hosts, even causes the RTT with arp_patrol_agent to be less 
than RTT without the agent. This suggests that the minor degradation in 
performance observed here could be statistically insignificant. 
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Figure 34: Percentage overhead 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this report I have described the problem of ARP cache poisoning in 
wireless networks. I have shown how the inherently secure wired clients are 
vulnerable to an attack from the wireless clients due to the nature of the setup of 
wireless-cum-wired networks within network devices like wireless access points 
or wireless routers. I have proposed a scheme to prevent the ARP cache 
poisoning attack from within these network devices.  
The proposed scheme is a feasible approach for preventing ARP cache 
poisoning, as it does not require any modification to the ARP protocol itself. Any 
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modification to the ARP protocol would require the TCP/IP stack of all the hosts 
that need protection to be changed.  
The scheme also does not add any significant overhead while sending and 
while receiving an ARP packet. The checking of the ARP packet is only done 
once in the Access Point and not at both the sending and receiving sides.  
As a proof of concept I have implemented the scheme in a popular wireless 
router, the WRT54GL manufactured by Linksys. The scheme protects any client 
that has received an IP address from a DHCP server from ARP cache poisoning. 
I have also explained the performance studies conducted and shown that there is 
negligible impact on the performance of the ARP protocol when my solution is 
implemented within the wireless router. 
The proposed scheme opens up various possibilities for enhancement. 
Some of the possibilities are described below: 
• The above design does not support hosts that have static IP addresses. 
When a wireless client wants to join a wireless network, it has to first 
associate with the Access Point. The Access Point at this time can learn the 
static IP address to MAC address mapping of the wireless client and store it 
in the mapping table.  
• The arp_patrol_agent code has been implemented currently to fit to the needs 
of the OpenWRT firmware installed in the Linksys wireless router. The code 
could be written such that it is more portable irrespective of the platform it has 
to operate on. 
• Reading from the dhcp.leases file could be done faster by storing the IP 
addresses once seen in a hash table along with their corresponding MAC 
addresses. When an ARP packet is received, if the IP address to MAC 
address mapping in the packet exists in the hash table then accept the 
packet; else check for the mapping in the dhcp.leases file.  
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